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Abstract While certain substantial moral dilemmas in
health care have been given much attention, like abortion,
euthanasia or gene testing, doctors rarely reﬂect on the
moral implications of their daily clinical work. Yet, with its
aim to help patients and relieve suffering, medicine is
replete with moral decisions. In this qualitative study we
analyse how doctors handle the moral aspects of everyday
clinical practice. About one hundred consultations were
observed, and interviews conducted with ﬁfteen clinical
doctors from different practices. It turned out that the
doctors’ approach to clinical cases followed a rather strict
pattern across specialities, which implied transforming
patients’ diverse concerns into speciﬁc medical questions
through a process of ‘essentialising’: Doctors broke the
patient’s story down, concretised the patient’s complaints
and categorised the symptoms into a medical sense.
Patients’ existential meanings were removed, and the focus
placed on the patients’ functioning. By essentialising,
doctors were able to handle a complex and ambiguous
reality, and establish a medically relevant problem. How-
ever, the process involved a moral as well as a practical
simpliﬁcation. Overlooking existential meanings and
focusing on purely functional aspects of patients was an
integral part of clinical practice and not an individual ﬂaw.
The study thus questions the value of addressing doctors’
conscious moral evaluations. Yet doctors should be aware
that their daily clinical work systematically emphasises
beneﬁcence at the expense of others—that might be more
important to the patient.
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Introduction
The ideal of being a good doctor is a powerful one for most
clinicians.
1 This involves not only technical skills, but also
an ability to attend to the moral demands of the profession.
Clinical medicine aims to relieve patients’ suffering and
improve their health, so every medical action has a moral
dimension (Pellegrino 2001; Carrese and Sugarman 2006).
Still, doctors rarely discuss ethical issues. Many doctors
perceive modern bioethics as alienating and of little rele-
vance to regular clinical work (Davies and Hudson 1999;
Førde et al. 1997). How can moral issues be so abundant in
clinical practice, yet so absent in medical discourse?
Recent empirical studies exploring the moral experience
of doctors mainly rely on interviews with doctors who
recount their own experience of moral problems (Holm
1997; Arnman 2004;K a ¨lvemark et al. 2004; Braunack-
Mayer 2001). These studies can, however, only address the
physicians’ conscious moral reasoning which may not
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to what doctors themselves deﬁne as moral problems, yet
the ethical aspects of medicine often remain tacit in prac-
tical work, and so are difﬁcult to reveal in an interview.
Some ethicists have suggested that doctors have poor
moral perception (Casarett 1999), whereas others have
brought up the inclination of doctors to express moral
judgements as medical ones (Sayers and Perera 2002).
Another possibility is that doctors’ moral judgements are
integrated in their medical judgements and therefore not
explicit. These proposals do not answer how doctors deal
with the speciﬁc moral parts of clinical medicine, but it
indicates that in order to establish doctors’ moral judge-
ments, we must also address their medical judgements. In
our study we have therefore examined doctors’ clinical
work in order to reveal how the moral aspects of their
practice are handled.
Method
We wanted to maximise the diversity of the data by
including doctors from different specialities, of both sexes,
and with varying age and experience. Over one hundred
hours of observation were conducted, including patient
consultations, ward rounds and various internal meetings.
In addition, interviews ranging from 20 to 60 min were
carried out with each participating doctor. In all 15 doctors
were observed and interviewed (by KMA): six general
practitioners, three surgeons and six internists from dif-
ferent practices and hospitals. Six general practitioners
were contacted directly by KMA (two of them declined
participation because of little patient contact), and two
were contacted by a participating GP. Each hospital
department was contacted via the department manager, and
the surgeons and the internists were recruited by the
department manager or by KMA. None of the hospital
doctors declined participation. All doctors and patients
were made aware of the study, and informed consent was
obtained from participating doctors and patients in direct
contact with the observed doctors. About 10% of the
patients in general practice and less than 5% of the patients
in the hospital setting declined participation. The Regional
Committee for Medical Research Ethics approved the
study, and the Directorate of Health granted dispensation
from conﬁdentiality.
The data were collected and analysed using grounded
theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Glaser 1978). Each doctor
was observed over a full working day, including internal
meetings, sitting rounds, ward rounds, and consultations
with patients. We did not limit data collection to cases
where the moral aspects of medicine were evident, such as
intensive care units, requests for abortion or care for dying
patients. While such cases also were represented in the
study, we wished to include the more tacit moral aspects
integrated in every day medicine, as the notion that all
clinical medicine has a moral dimension was a central
premise of the study. In accordance with the method, the
ﬁeld was ﬁrst approached without any clear theory or
distinct research question. The observer (KMA) aimed to
stay open to what was happening in the ﬁeld, and to what
were the participants main concerns, all the time compar-
ing similarities and dissimilarities in the doctors’ clinical
approaches. Especially noted was the doctors’ line of rea-
soning, value-laden expressions, elements of conﬂict
between participants, surprising events, or just a feeling
that ‘‘something is going on’’. As the analysis proceeded
the observer aimed to test and elaborate emerging cate-
gories more speciﬁcally.
An interview was conducted with the observed doctor
immediately after each observation day. In one instance the
interviewwasdonethedayafterobservation.Theinterviews
were semi-structured and focused on clinical situations that
had occurred during the working day. After a small enquiry
about how the doctor felt about the observation, the inter-
view continued with questions like: ‘‘Were there any
patients or situations today, which you found especially
demanding?’’ Subsequent questions explored the doctors’
intentions and thoughts about a speciﬁc patient or their
concrete practice. The interviews also presented an oppor-
tunity to pick up onaspects the observer could have failedto
notice. Moral expressions and evaluating statements were
intentionally avoided. At the end of the interviews, partici-
pants were invited to a more evaluative discourse with
questions like: ‘‘What was your aim as a doctor in this
speciﬁc consultation?’’ or ‘‘Have you done anything today
that made you feel like a good doctor?’’ To minimise dis-
turbance by the researcher, data was gatheredby taking ﬁeld
notes immediately after the observations and interviews.
This is also in line with the analytical method used, as
redundancy of little relevant data is to be avoided. The ﬁeld
notes described participants’ uttering and actions, as well as
the context of the observed situations.
The observation and interview notes were ﬁrst coded
incident by incident, while constantly comparing the inci-
dents with each other and with emerging concepts. As
certain concepts constantly appeared in the data, further
analysis followed these central issues together with a more
selective coding. NVivo7 software was used to organize
the codes and the emerging categories. General practitio-
ners were ﬁrst included, and after a preliminary analysis a
medical and a surgical department were chosen in an effort
to modify and deepen the emerging concepts. This theo-
retical sampling was done in several cycles, and analysis
was constantly ongoing with data collection. KMA gath-
ered and coded all data, and the analysis was constantly
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2 Preliminary
results were also presented and discussed with a group of
clinical physicians to enhance validity. Data collection
continued until the emerging theoretical concepts had
reached saturation level, and no further observations and
interviews brought up any new signiﬁcant information
about the central concepts and their interrelationship. The
constant comparative analysis employed in this research is
hermeneutical in that it requires a constant shift between
empirical gathering of data and formulation of theoretical
concepts, which again are constantly modiﬁed by new
empirical data. As a result, the study is not an empirical
collection and summary of data, but an attempt to gain
theoretical insight into the ﬁeld. The aim of the analysis is
to generate conceptual categories that can account for
much of the doctors’ behaviour. These categories and their
interrelations form the substantial theory here presented.
Results
As intended, there was considerable diversity among
patients, clinical problems, professional environments, and
doctors’ personalities. Despite these differences, it soon
became clear that the doctors approached the clinical sit-
uation basically the same way. Irrespective of the problem
presented, the doctors struggled to handle each particular
problem within the limits of medicine, and this shaped their
approach to patients and clinical cases. Their mutual way
of handling clinical issues was best understood as a process
we have called ‘essentialising’.
Essentialising roughly consisted of deconstructing the
situation at hand and the patients’ concerns, and recon-
structing selected elements into a speciﬁc clinical problem.
Through this reconstruction of the clinical problem, it
became possible to handle the problem within the scope of
biomedicine. Essentialising was a way of addressing the
complexity of a practical case and come out with a deﬁned
clinical problem. The process consisted of several interre-
lated, but distinct, ways to modify and direct the problem at
hand. These were not explicit actions, but altogether
common and ever recurring parts of their clinical practice.
Break down
Adistinctfeatureofthedoctors’clinicalapproachwasbreak
down of the situation or patient information. Doctors split
the situation into smaller units for easier systematisation of
the situation. The patients could present vague symptoms or
complex medical problems with other enmeshed anxieties.
To handle such compound enquiries, the doctors broke the
problem down into smaller, more manageable parts. By
doing this it was possible to address each component of the
problem separately:
A female patient enters the practitioners’ ofﬁce, seems
stressed and talks fast in broken Norwegian. She sinks
intoachair.Patient:‘‘I’msoill;Idonothavetheenergy
to do anything. My neck hurts, I’m freezing, I’m weak,
I have to do an assignment, but this is not working
out…’’ Doctor: ‘‘Your neck hurts?’’ Patient: ‘‘Yes, my
throat is soar and I’m aching here [pointing at the side
of her neck]. I always get a soar throat, maybe every
month.IthoughtIshouldhaveanoperation…’’Doctor:
‘‘Does it hurt anywhere else?’’ Patient: ‘‘Yes, my back
hurts.Andmychest.Andmylegsarehurtingabittoo.’’
Doctor: ‘‘A little bit of everywhere, I gather? Do you
have fever?’’ Patient: ‘‘Yes.’’ Doctor: ‘‘Have you
measured your temperature?’’ Patient: ‘‘No, I do not
haveathermometer.’’Doctor:‘‘Thenyoumustgethold
of one! Do you have fever now?’’ Patient: ‘‘No, I don’t
think so.’’ [Feels herforehead]Doctor:‘‘Do youhave a
cough?’’. (Doctor 10)
In order to better understand the patient’s vague illness,
the doctor breaks down the clinical situation into concrete
questions that the patient is able to answer.
Although the patients often presented the problems
through the use of continuous and narrative stories, the
doctors were not concerned with the narrative, and inter-
rupted to fragment the patients’ stories so that they could
obtain the medically relevant information:
The patient sighs heavily as she sits down. Patient:
Well, now it has got to the other shoulder! She pats
her right shoulder. Doctor: What do you do for a
living? Patient: I work in the home nursing care.
Doctor: As…? Patient: An enrolled nurse. Doctor:
Yes. It is hard work? Patient: No, not especially. It
was worse back when I was working at the nursing
home, then you just had to take whatever turned up.
You know, I had to change my workplace when the
trouble started in my other shoulder… Doctor [takes a
look at his computer]: Then you were on sick leave
for two years? Patient: Yes, and now it has got to my
other shoulder… Doctor: Yes. What do you want me
to do for you then? (Doctor 13)
We here sense that the patient wants to tell the story of
her former work, how her shoulder afﬂictions made her
quit her job, and her anxieties about it now reoccurring.
The doctor, however, wants to cut the story short and pay
attention to the facts necessary for intervention.
2 The main author (KMA) also participated in two consecutive
Grounded Theory seminars (London 2006 and 2007) hosted by The
Grounded Theory Institute, where some of the data and the emerging
theory was presented to and discussed with Dr. Barney Glaser, one of
the founder of this methodology.
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Another aspect of the doctors’ clinical approach was con-
cretising the situation and the patients’ complaints. When
doctors discussed cases with colleagues, they stressed often
visible or measurable aspects such as blood pressure, blood
tests, radiographs, and clinical ﬁndings:
Doctor I: She has been admitted for rehabilitation.
She is poorly mobilised and nourished, and she is low
in albumin. Nurse: Is she the one with the black toes?
Doctor II: They are not black; they are poorly cir-
culated. Doctor I: We have to at least mobilise her
into a chair. Doctor II: She also has diarrhoea and a
positive Hemofec. It is somewhat hard to interpret.
But judging her blood values, everything looks better.
(Doctor 6 and colleague)
This patient is no clear-cut medical case, but the doctors
are deﬁning the problem in terms of concrete bodily
functions and test results.
Patients were also asked to point out the precise location
of their problem, to quantify their pain, and to specify their
worries. Concretising was used as a means of clarifying
what the patient was actually talking about. Bodily expe-
riences are of such a private nature that it can often be
difﬁcult to establish what a particular patient means when
describing a sensation. Concretising was a way in which
doctors could objectify the patients’ descriptions and thus
reach mutual understanding of the problem:
A consultant talks to an elderly male patient during
rounds: ‘‘How much pain are you in?’’ Patient: ‘‘Well
…’’ Consultant: ‘‘Is it any better now than when you
arrived, or is it just as painful?’’ Patient: ‘‘Well … It
is what it is … sometimes better, sometimes worse.’’
Consultant: ‘‘Sometimes better and sometimes worse,
eh?’’ Patient: ‘‘It’s worse when I stand still. It’s
somewhat better to walk a little.’’ Consultant:
‘‘Indeed? When you walked over here from your
room, how much did it hurt? On a scale from 1 to
10?’’ Patient: ‘‘2.’’ Consultant: ‘‘How far could you
walk then?’’ Patient: ‘‘To the kiosk.’’ Consultant:
‘‘Did you walk all the way to the kiosk upstairs? How
painful was that, on a scale from 1 to 10?’’ (Doctor 9)
The patient is very vague about his afﬂictions, so to
establish whether or not the treatment has been beneﬁcial,
the doctor is forcing him to state a precise level of pain and
distance of walking.
Categorising
A third part of the doctors’ clinical approach was catego-
rising the information. When patients described an
afﬂiction, doctors placed it into an appropriate medical
category. In this way patients’ feelings and statements were
categorised as distinct medical symptoms, which could
then be entered into the medical record:
Interviewer: ‘‘Your ﬁrst patient today mentioned that
she had discomfort in her chest. What were your
thoughts about that?’’ Doctor: ‘‘She brought it up
somewhat late in the consultation and I was begin-
ning to run out of time. It didn’t sound that serious,
and it wasn’t anything acute, she had had it for sev-
eral years. I could have taken a spirometry of
course… Most likely it is muscular, she is sitting
quite tense, like this.’’ [Shows her posture] (Doctor 3)
Although the doctor had ignored the patient’s expres-
sions of chest discomfort in the consultation, he had
actually noticed her complaint. Because of the circum-
stances of the case, the medical history, the patient posture
and the timing in the consultation, he categorised the
complaint as nothing serious, likely muscular—and not in
need of medical attention.
When the doctors examined their patients, they deﬁned
their results as medically normal or abnormal in a deﬁnite
way, thus categorising their own observations as distinct
medical ﬁndings:
A resident confers with the attending physician about
a middle-aged female patient. Attending: ‘‘Where is
her pain situated?’’ Resident: ‘‘She has pain every-
where!’’ Attending: ‘‘Does it hurt when you touches
her nose? [Laughs] I’m exaggerating, but it’s
important to check if the patient expresses pain
wherever you touch her, because then it reﬂects
something else.’’ (Doctor 4)
The resident has examined the patient and found that her
whole body is hurting, and he does not know how to deal
with such an extensive pain. The attending insinuates that
the resident has just described the patient’s expressions,
and not categorised it into a clinical ﬁnding. He implies
that if the patient utters pain during the whole examination,
it should not be categorised as medically relevant pain.
Existential ﬁltering
Breaking down, concretising and categorising can be seen
as purely practical ways of addressing a complex reality,
but essentialising also entailed ways of handling the more
value-laden aspects of the situation. In an effort to direct
their focus of attention, the doctors undertook an existential
ﬁltering. When approaching a case or a patient, the doctors
systematically ignored the more existential meaning in
order to direct the medical issue. The problems were faced
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that the doctors could do something about:
An elderly female patient is discussed at sitting
rounds. Doctor: ‘‘We have discontinued treatment on
this patient. How is she?’’ Nurse: ‘‘She is getting
worse. She does not want any care and pushes us
away.’’ Doctor: ‘‘Her CRP-level is about to explode!
You have to take her temperature.’’ Nurse: ‘‘But is
she going to have any medication? We are not able to
give her anything to swallow anyhow.’’ Doctor: ‘‘No,
she will not have any; we have discontinued her
treatment.’’ Nurse: ‘‘But in that case you have to
record it on the medical chart, because she has been
given medication these last 24 hours.’’ Doctor:
‘‘Precisely. Well, then I will withdraw this: Antibi-
otics, anti-coagulation…’’ (Doctor 1)
The situation is obviously existential for this patient,
who is about to die, but the medical discussion does not
evolve around the patient’s anticipated death. Instead, they
discuss test results, medication, and practical issues con-
cerning chart registration.
Existential ﬁltering took the focus away from the
patients’ private feelings and what the suffering meant to
the particular patient. The subjective meaning of the con-
dition was not addressed by the doctors, and sometimes
even actively suppressed:
A disconsolate patient who had recently had an extra
uterine pregnancy explains that her husband recently
told her that he had developed a Chlamydia infection.
She is crying. Patient: ‘‘And now I do not know if this
could have caused my extra uterine pregnancy!’’ The
doctor does not answer this question. Doctor: ‘‘But
did you not take a Chlamydia test while you were
pregnant?’’ Patient: ‘‘No … I don’t know.’’ Doctor:
‘‘It is one of the standard tests.’’ He looks in her
record. Patient: ‘‘This other doctor went so far as to
imply that my husband had been cheating on me. He
said that anything else would be very unlikely.’’
Doctor: ‘‘I’m sorry he was so determined. There are
two alternatives: one is that you have had a latent
infection, or else he has infected you. You talk to
your husband, and I will call the microbiologist to get
hold of your test results from the pregnancy.’’
(Doctor 15)
Here, the underlying issue is of utmost importance to the
patient: Is her husband cheating on her? Although aware of
it, the doctor does not address this question directly. This
existential aspect of the clinical issue is left to the patient,
and the doctor limits his effort to the practical question of
whether or not this is a newly acquired infection or a
reactivation of an earlier one.
Functional focus
While existential ﬁltering divested the case of certain
values, others were accentuated. Through their functional
focus, the doctors draw the focus of attention to the
patients’ physical and mental function. Irrespective of how
a problem was presented, the aim was understood in terms
of improving the patient’s functional abilities:
A terminal cancer patient is discussed during sitting
rounds: Nurse: ‘‘She wants to go home.’’ Doctor:
‘‘Yes, I have spoken to her regular doctor about how
we should handle her. She has these reconstruction
plans for her house in preparation for returning home.
We cannot tell her too brutally. We cannot demolish
her psychological defences. She became aggressive
once when we tried to address her unrealistic
arrangements. At the same time she knows how
serious this is. It is a psychological defence, and the
only thing preventing deep depression. So we must
allow her that.’’ (Doctor 6)
Thepatientdoesnotseemtobeawareofthegravityofher
own illness, and the staff is struggling with how much of the
truth to reveal. The doctor phrases this into a question of
what will beneﬁt the patient’s psychological function.
The functional focus was implicitly present in most of
the doctors’ clinical practice, and in many instances they
also explicitly deﬁned the motivation for their actions in
terms of beneﬁting the patient’s function:
Doctor: ‘‘We had an elderly lady here last month with
lots of different somatic problems, and she was
confused too. She was referred to different depart-
ments around the hospital, and every department only
cared about their little detached parts, ﬁxed it and
sent her home. And she kept coming back to the
doctor. Last time, she was having surgery in her
bladder, but they postponed it. She was kept fasting
for days – an elderly woman with such tiny reserves!
If we could ﬁx her somatic problems and calmed the
environments around her, I’m sure she could function
a lot better.’’ (Doctor 12)
The doctor rejects the fragmented treatment of this
elderly patient, not because he considers it dehumanising to
the patient, but because a different approach would beneﬁt
her functional level.
The elements here presented describe different aspects
of essentialising, but are fundamentally interrelated, and
often occurred simultaneously in a single encounter or case
discussion. Breaking down and concretising the patient’s
complaints could enhance the existential ﬁltering of a case,
and categorising the problem in medical terms often
involved a functional focus.
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concept that describes doctors’ clinical work in a useful way.
It reveals some of the difﬁculties of clinical work, and what
the doctors’ are striving to come to terms with in each par-
ticular case. Essentialising describes doctors’ practical
manner of handling multifaceted and often ambiguous clin-
icalsituations in a medical way. Bysystematically reframing
theproblemsintoquestionsthatcouldbeansweredwithinthe
medical framework, they sought to pinpoint those elements
of the patients’ suffering that they could do something about.
In addition to being a practical method of deconstructing a
complex reality, it was also a way of establishing the pur-
pose—or essence—of clinical intervention.
Discussion
With this small exploratory study we have tried to provide
a new perspective on doctors’ moral practice in daily
clinical work. Despite the fairly small number of infor-
mants, the number of clinical situations was large and
varied. The substantial theory generated from these clinical
situations is therefore intended to be transferable to other
clinical situations, and a helpful starting point for further
studies on clinical work (Malterud 2001). The theory gains
its credibility from the clear empirical foundation, the
recognition of the concepts by clinicians and that the theory
is valuable for understanding the practice (Wilson and
Hutchinson 1991). As the main researcher (KMA) is her-
self a doctor, some well known dangers in doing research
on one’s own profession has to be carefully considered
(Wadel 1991). On the other hand, being a doctor helped the
researcher to gain access to the clinical situations and to
understand the doctors’ medical terminology and actions,
and probably minimised the intrusion of daily practice.
Sociology studies of doctors’ clinical decision-making
have shown that their decisions are not mere calculation of
medical facts, but that doctors actively shape the clinical
problem (McKinlay et al. 1996; Luftey et al. 2008). This is
consistent with our ﬁndings, although our theory of es-
sentialising also addresses the moral aspects of clinical
practice. The process of essentialising simpliﬁed the situ-
ations both practically and morally. Patients’ private values
were disregarded as the doctors persistently focused on
what they could do for the patients’ physical and mental
functions. In this way essentialising was founded on a
moral responsibility to do the best for the patients’ health.
Although implicit, their clinical practice constantly
emphasised the moral value of beneﬁcence. Thus, the
doctors’ medical decisions could not be separated from
their moral decisions, as beneﬁcence constituted a moral
base for their medical actions
. Beneﬁcence is used here in a
broad sense, as the doctors were concerned about
improving their patients’ health, both by preventing harm
and promoting health.
3 Other empirical studies have found
beneﬁcence to be a principal moral consideration of doc-
tors (McGuire et al. 2005; Blondeau et al. 1998), although
the doctors in our study were primarily concerned with
patients’ function, rather than the best possibilities for all
aspects of patients’ lives.
The tendency of medicine to dehumanise patients has
long been debated and criticised (Cassell 1991). Danger
occurs when doctors ﬁlter out the personal experience of
suffering, and patients’ feeling of being dehumanised
exacerbates their distress rather than relieving it (Daneault
et al. 2006). Despite doctors’ good intentions, they risk
harming instead of helping these patients. In our study we
do ﬁnd that doctors systematically overlook the private
experience of patients, which may indeed leave the patients
feeling objectiﬁed. But what our study adds is that this
process is not done because doctors fail to see patients as
people, but as a moral imperative of beneﬁting the patients.
Essentialising is not a move away from moral values, but a
shift where the value of beneﬁcence is emphasised.
Our study indicates that ﬁltering of existential values is
not a shortcoming of individual doctors, but a product of
their systematic clinical approach. Likewise, the emphasis
on beneﬁcence does not result from doctors’ personal
beliefs,butisanintegralpartofclinicalpractice—partofthe
process of essentialising. A request for more ethics educa-
tion would not solve the problem because it is not a question
of doctors lacking ethical knowledge, and, as we have
shown, the process of essentialising is in fact morally
motivated.Demandsforamorecaringandholisticmedicine
wouldnotbeconsistentwithdoctors’needtoessentialisethe
clinical problem. With its focus on human functions, med-
ical knowledge demarcates what doctors can deal with
professionally. It remains an open question whether medi-
cine can actually address the more existential aspects of
suffering.
Nevertheless, doctors and their patients should be aware
that clinical practice tends to take only a single moral
consideration into account—beneﬁting patients’ physical
and mental function. Other moral values are largely dis-
regarded in the process of essentialising. If there is a
message for patients from this study, it is that, if you feel
objectivated by your doctor, he probably does it with the
3 In this study we do not distinguish between beneﬁcence and non-
maleﬁcence, as frequently done (Beauchamp and Childress 1979),
because we ﬁnd no clear evidence in the data for making this
distinction. In line with the intentions of Grounded Theory not to rely
on predeﬁned categories, we only use conceptions that emerge as
relevant from the data. In our observations, doctors did not distinguish
between preventing harm and promoting good for the patients’ health,
and so this distinction was considered superﬂuous for the purpose of
describing their practice.
112 K. M. Agledahl et al.
123best intentions. And the moral lesson for doctors is that,
even if your clinically sound decision is morally motivated,
it may not necessarily be the morally good thing to do.
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